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The reinstatement of US sanctions on Iran last year within the Trump
Administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign has undoubtedly hit the
Iranian economy hard. Amongst other markers, living costs in Iran are
rising dramatically – in June, in ation rates stood at 50%; and the rial
has lost almost 60% of its value against the US dollar on the uno cial
market.
Judging the extent to which these economic setbacks are forcing the
Islamic Republic to scale back material support to paramilitary groups
across the region (which served as the pretext for Trump’s unilateral
withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action last May), or
indeed investment into cultural diplomacy and charitable activities in
neighbouring countries, is of course challenging. Tehran does not make
a habit of broadcasting its expenditures abroad, but the government
has made it abundantly clear that it intends to ride the storm of US
sanctions (again). In this respect, there is little prospect of it
abandoning its allies or its cultural initiatives in Palestine, Yemen, Syria
or Iraq (let alone Lebanon). Even so, domestic criticism of Iran’s foreign
funding is pushing the regime to take a more defensive public stance on
justifying its foreign policies.
At a time when perhaps a third of the population lives below the poverty
line, Iran’s  nancial backing to causes other than its own people’s
welfare is controversial; and even a theocracy is vulnerable to domestic
censure, particularly when it levies appreciable taxes. Indeed, Rouhani’s
rare attempt at budgetary transparency in December 2017 sparked
mass public protests, partly because of what it revealed about the vast
sums directed towards religious institutions involved in promulgating
the regime’s ideological legitimacy. While the budget said little about
funding abroad, over the last few years there have been concerted
efforts amongst Iranian and Iranian-a liated charitable institutions in
the region to demonstrate that they are not draining Iran’s resources.
In some cases this has involved demonstrating that Iran’s economy is
also bene ting from external investment (for instance, by claiming that
the majority of Iranian donations to the restoration of Iraqi shrines feeds
back into the Iranian economy through employment, logistics
operations and the purchasing of Iranian raw materials). In others, it has
involved denying that Iran is in fact funding charitable initiatives abroad,
and asserting that its main contributions consist of technical expertise.
One notable institution in this respect is the Imam Khomeini Relief
Agency (IKRA), Iran’s best known and longest running internationally
active charitable foundation which is directly connected to Khamenei’s
o ce, and which in the past has run high-pro le relief operations,
primarily directed towards Shi’a populations in ‘fragile’ zones. In 2010,
the US designated IKRA’s Lebanon branch a foreign terrorist
organisation based on its connections to Hezbollah. Last year IKRA
removed the page on ‘external activities’ from its website, amidst public
censure regarding its Ramadan aid missions to Gaza. IKRA in Iraq,
which has been active since 2006, and has o cial memorandums of
understanding with the Iraqi Ministry of Sport and Youth and Ministry of
Labour, has o ces in Najaf, Karbala, Kadhemiya and Basra. It has
repeatedly noted in Farsi language public statements that it is
independent from its Iranian mother organisation, and that all of the
funds it raises for Iraqi causes emanates from Iraq, not Iran.
IKRA Iraq has an active Arabic-language Facebook page showing its
charitable activities including the regular distribution of food rations to
Iraqi families in need, and implementation of vocational training
courses. In 2015 after Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s ‘blessing’ of the Popular
Mobilisation Units (the Hashd) IKRA Iraq set up collection boxes in Iraqi
cities for the ‘Holy Hashd’.
And, in April 2019, the tables turned as the agency issued a public call
to Iraqis to donate zakat and sadaqa funds to assist Iranians affected
by  ooding in the Western provinces. The call read: ‘After they stood
with us to  ght Daesh, it is our turn to reciprocate and to stand with the
Muslim Iranian people to confront the  oods that have destroyed life in
Iran’. Both Iranian and Iraqi press indicated that the Popular
Mobilisation Units (PMU), including their leaders Abu Mahdi al-
Muhandis and Harakat al-Najba delivered humanitarian aid to  ood
victims via the Mehran border crossing on the invitation of Iranian Qods
Force leader, Qassem Soleimani. One article noted that other Iranian
charitable organisations had been banned by the authorities from
delivering aid.
Iran’s public emphasis on Iranian-a liated organisations in Iraq acting
as partners as opposed to helpless dependents can be seen partly as
the product of a public relations exercise to alleviate domestic criticism.
But it has also become associated with the Iranian model of external
intervention, exempli ed in Lebanon. Since its establishment during the
Lebanese civil war, Hezbollah has developed progressively more
autonomy from Iran, and while it undoubtedly still relies on Iranian
weaponry, most of its funding appears to come from donations from its
core Lebanese Shi’a constituency, and from successful integration into
and exploitation of the Lebanese political economy. In Iraq, following
the campaign against Daesh, Iranian-a liated Shi’a PMUs such as
Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat al-Najba and the Imam Ali
Brigades as well as Badr, have become embedded into local political
marketplaces, using their roles as security actors to extract trade tariffs,
negotiate business agreements, and in some cases gain access to oil
industry pro ts.
In the charitable sector too, the Lebanese experience is instructive.
Hezbollah’s network of Beirut-based NGOs established in the 1980s
were initially funded by Iran, but increasingly relied on Lebanese Shi’a
donations to provide welfare to injured  ghters, their families, widows
and orphans, but also vocational training which could make
bene ciaries self-su cient and even contributors to other charitable
causes. It was arguably the combination of militant resistance with
social welfare provisioning that secured a steadfast support group
within Lebanese society. In Iraq, even if some Iranian-a liated charities
are in fact still dependent on Iran, the goal is clearly that they should
become self-supporting, bearing Iran’s wilayat al-faqih (governance of
jurisprudent) ideology, without placing undue burdens on Iran’s
economy.
Of course, the Iraqi predicament differs substantially from that in
Lebanon, quite apart from the fact that the PMU are now o cially part
of the state security apparatus, whereas Hezbollah never has been. On
the one hand, Shi’ism in Iraqi society, where perhaps 70 percent of the
40 million strong population is at least nominally Shi’a, occupies a
rather different place to that in Lebanon, where only a minority of the six
million people are Shi’a. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is by far the most
popular militant-political organisation amongst the Shi’a: Iran has
consistently associated itself with Hezbollah and vice versa. By
comparision, in Iraq, there are many competing Shi’a parties, and many
competing Shi’a militias, and Iran has  uctuated between playing
paternalistic, mediatory and provocative roles amongst these factions.
Moreover, Khamenei’s brand of wilayat al-faqih faces a tough crowd
amongst Iraqi Shi’a, where Ali Sistani’s much touted political quietism
(breached only in dire circumstances) is the norm. In the aftermath of
the military campaign against Daesh, Iraqis are increasingly critical of
Iran’s role in Iraq.
On the other hand, when it comes to welfare, even though the Iraqi
federal government is in disarray, Iraqis in need still look to the state
welfare system to provide a safety net, whereas in Lebanon, overall,
charities, NGOs, private insurance and self-help mechanisms play a
more prominent role. As a result, barring the eventuality of a complete
break-down in this safety net, the practical role played by IKRA and
other charitable organisations linked to Iran in Iraq is only ever likely to
be peripheral.
But all the same, the Trump Administration should be careful what it
wishes for. It wants Iran to cut material support to militant groups
across the region. But that is presumably also what Iran wants: to foster
institutions abroad which are capable of becoming enmeshed into the
fabric of their own economies and societies to the extent that they no
longer need Iranian funding.
Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of
the Con ict Research Programme, the London School of Economics
and Political Science, or the UK Government.
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